Great Lakes, Weak Policy: The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement and Compact and Non-Regulation of the Water  Products  Industry by Petrash, Lauren
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
10-1-2007
Great Lakes, Weak Policy: The Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources
Agreement and Compact and Non-Regulation of
the Water "Products" Industry
Lauren Petrash
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr
Part of the Comparative and Foreign Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Inter-
American Law Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lauren Petrash, Great Lakes, Weak Policy: The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement and Compact
and Non-Regulation of the Water "Products" Industry, 39 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. Rev. 145 (2007)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umialr/vol39/iss1/5
Great Lakes, Weak Policy:
The Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Sustainable Water Resources Agreement and
Compact and Non-Regulation of the
Water "Products" Industry
Lauren Petrash*
I. COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE GREAT LAKEs BASIN... 147
II. PRIOR TREATIES, LEGISLATION, AND AGREEMENTS ..... 152
A. Boundary Waters Treaty (1909) .................. 152
B. Great Lakes Basin Compact (1968) .............. 153
C. Great Lakes Charter (1985) ..................... 154
D. Water Resources Development Act (1986) ......... 155
E. Great Lakes Charter Annex (2001) ............... 155
III. THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN
SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES AGREEMENT AND
COMPACT ............................................ 156
A. How the Agreement and Compact Work .......... 156
B. Regulatory Distinctions and the "Product"
Loophole ......................................... 157
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF A NON-
REGULATORY REGIME FOR BOTTLED WATER AND
OTHER "PRODUCTS" .................................... 163
A . NA FTA .......................................... 163
B. Dormant Commerce Clause ...................... 166
V. PRIVATE JUDICIAL ACTION: ALL THAT'S LEFT FOR
GREAT LAKES STAKEHOLDERS? . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167
A. Common Law, the Public Trust Doctrine, and
State Statutes in Michigan Citizens for Water
Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters North America,
In c ............................................... 168
VI. CONCLUSION ......................................... 176
Water resource management in the Great Lakes basin has
long been a cooperative effort among jurisdictions in Canada and
the United States. Since the early 1900s, treaties, compacts,
* J.D. Candidate, May 2008, University of Miami School of Law; B.S. University
of Michigan, 2005. I would like to thank the members of the Inter-American Law
Review for their hard work preparing this article for publication, and my family and
friends for their constant encouragement.
INTER-AMERICAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1
informal agreements, and common law have allocated water
among the major stakeholders in the region.1 Recent concerns
over diversion of water outside the Basin (especially for irrigation
in the American West) have spurred an onslaught of negotiations
between Great Lakes states and provinces, culminating in the
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Sustainable Resources
Agreement and Compact, both signed in 2005.2 While the
Agreement and Compact (enforceable as federal law once
approved by Congress) ban most "diversions" of water outside the
basin, they permit a wide array of "withdrawals" and
"consumptive uses" within the basin, subject to an extremely
weak "overall reasonableness" standard.' As a direct result of the
Agreement and Compact, private bottling companies continue to
draw water from the Great Lakes and export it freely, despite
opposition from citizens, tribes, and environmental groups.4
Furthermore, the Agreement and Compact leave bottled Great
Lakes water subject to the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA) and the dormant Commerce Clause, which could open
up the Great Lakes to exploitation by a broad range of remote
interests.' Within this context, the Agreement and Compact's
allowance of withdrawal for bottling presents an urgent problem
1. GOVT OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, THE GREAT LAKES: AN
ENVIRONMENTAL ATLAS AND RESOURCE BOOK 39-42 (3d ed. 1995).
2. See generally Council of Great Lake Governors, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence
River Basin Sustainable Resources Agreement, 1-2, Dec. 13, 2005, [hereinafter
Agreement], http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/GreatLakes-St_
LawrenceRiverBasinSustainableWaterResourcesAgreement.pdf ("[r]ecognizing
that, the waters of the basin" are a "renewable but finite" resource requiring
conservation management); Council of Great Lake Governors , Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Resources Compact, §1.3, Dec. 13, 2005
[hereinafter Compact], http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/12-13-05/Great-
Lakes-StLawrenceRiverBasinWaterResourcesCompact.pdf (finding that the
"Parties have a shared duty to protect ... the renewable but finite Waters of the
Basin").
3. Agreement, supra note 2, at 7-10; Compact, supra note 2, at 11.
4. Recent cases challenging bottled water companies include Little Traverse Bay
Band of Odawa Indians v. Great Springs Waters of America, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d 853
(W.D.Mich 2002) and Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters
North America Inc., 269 Mich.App. 25 (2005). The bottled water debate is also
prevalent in the news. See Janet Ginsburg, Where They're Boiling Over Water,
BUSINESSWEEK, May 27, 2002; Anonymous, Using and Abusing, CANADA & THE
WORLD BACKGROUNDER, May 31, 2001; Michael Hawthorne, War Over Bottled Water
Could Leave Many Dry, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, June 13, 2004, at Metro.
5. Bottled water is likely to be treated as a "good" under NAFTA, GATT, and the
Commerce Clause. See generally Marcia Valiante, Harmonization of Great Lakes
Water Management in the Shadow of NAFTA, 81 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 525 (2004).
Noah D. Hall, Toward a New Horizontal Federalism: Interstate Water Management in
the Great Lakes Region, 77 U. COLO. L. REV. 405, 451-2 (2006).
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for the ecologically sensitive and immeasurably important Great
Lakes.
This article will discuss the major water use interests in the
Great Lakes Basin and identify the major stakeholders in the
bottled water debate. It will then examine prior treaties, statutes,
and agreements among the parties involved to highlight the
driving forces of Great Lakes policy. The article will provide a
comprehensive analysis of the latest Great Lakes water use policy
measures, the 2005 Agreement and Compact, with special
attention to the treatment (or avoidance) of the bottled water
industry. Finally, the article will summarize a recent court
decision to extract some of the potential judicial mechanisms for
enforcing restraints on the bottling and exporting of water from
the Great Lakes Basin.
I. COMPETING INTERESTS IN THE GREAT LAKES BASIN
The Great Lakes Basin contains 18 percent of the world's sup-
ply of fresh water, second in volume only to polar ice caps. The
basin spans over 750 miles from west to east, covering parts of
eight states and two Canadian provinces. One tenth of the popu-
lation of the United States and one quarter of the population of
Canada live in the Great Lakes Basin, totaling over 33 million
people.6 To residents of the Basin, the Great Lakes serve as an
important provider of drinking water, sanitation, agriculture,
industry, power, transportation, fish, and recreation. Not surpris-
ingly, the lakes and adjacent land in the Basin promote a strong
regional identity and emotional connection for local residents.7
The range of stakeholders in any debate regarding the Great
Lakes is about as vast as the Basin itself. Great Lakes policy deci-
sions come from national, state, provincial, and local governments
and special administrative bodies on both sides of the border, each
of which claims some degree of jurisdiction over Great Lakes
water. Other stakeholders include Native American tribes and
Canadian First Nations, user and environmental NGOs, and the
general public.'
For many decades, the major concern about Great Lakes
water had been water quality and pollution. Rapid settlement
and industrialization left toxic and bacterial contaminants, the
6. GOVT OF CAN. & U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 3-5.
7. Valiante, supra note 5, at 525.
8. Dan Tarlock, Five Views of the Great Lakes and Why they Might Matter, 15
MINN. J. INT'L L. 21, 27 (2006).
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remedies for which were largely addressed in the Great Lakes
Water Quality Agreement between Canada and the United States
in 1972.' Although much pollution remains, more recent concerns
have involved the quantity of Great Lakes water, as the various
uses of the Great Lakes by a growing population conflict with one
another. The possibility of large-scale diversion projects for irriga-
tion in southwestern states is a well-known concern among Great
Lakes residents, but newer threats hit closer to home. Specifi-
cally, a significantly sized bottled water industry threatens the
use rights of numerous inhabitants of the basin who claim a supe-
rior right to the resource. Bottling companies pump water out of
the ground from the same aquifer that feeds the lakes.1" This
water is packaged and sold outside the basin, never to return to
the lakes, potentially causing a drop in water tables and lake
levels.1 As University of Arizona professor Robert Glennon puts
it, "think of an aquifer as a giant milkshake that we drink with a
straw... If you put too many straws into the same glass, it's a
recipe for disaster."12 Threats of global warming, whether legiti-
mate or not, further fuel concerns of decreasing average lake
levels, since warmer temperatures mean increased evaporation
and retention in the atmosphere.13 As the National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration explained in a recent report on Great
Lakes water levels, Lake Michigan, Lake Huron, and Lake Erie
are currently experiencing their lowest water levels in 35 years,
due to a combination of lower precipitation, and high air
temperatures.14
In February of 2000, the International Joint Commission
(IJC), a six member, multi-jurisdictional group established by the
1909 Boundary Waters Treaty to study the Great Lakes and seek
common solutions between the U.S. and Canada,15 released its
Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States
regarding protection of the waters of the Great Lakes.16 While the
9. GovTw OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 4.
10. Hawthorne, supra note 4.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Gov'T OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 9.
14. Lakes Michigan and Huron dropped by 3.4 feet and Lake Erie dropped by 3.13
feet in the past 35 years. National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, Great
Lakes Environmental Research Laboratory, Great Lakes Water Levels, available at:
http://www.glerl.noaa.gov/data/now/wlevels/lowlevels.html (last visited September
22, 2007).
15. GOVT OF CAN. & U.S. ENvTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 41.
16. International Joint Commission, Protection of the Waters of the Great Lakes:
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report recognized numerous potential threats to water quantity,
including large-scale diversions, climate change, and consumptive
uses generally, it stated the IJC's findings that the bottled water
industry "appears to have no effect on water levels in the Great
Lakes Basin as a whole," largely because many retailers and con-
sumers in the Great Lakes Basin import bottled water that comes
from sources outside the Basin. 7 The report went on to state,
however, that "there could be local effects in and around the with-
drawal sites."' Even if the bottled water industry does not
decrease the total amount of water within the Great Lakes Basin,
these local effects, including lower water tables, lower lake levels
and the need to pump water higher, are the major source of frus-
tration for many Basin residents. 9
Even more cause for concern, the demand for bottled water is
currently on the rise in the United States and the rest of the
world. In 1990, a major business news source reported that "[a]t a
prices six times that of gasoline, bottled water is the fastest-grow-
ing segment of the U.S. beverage industry."" By 2005, another
source reported that consumption of bottled water has more than
doubled in the U.S. in the past decade, and that in both the U.S.
and Canada, close to one fifth of the population depends on bottled
water.2'
Proponents of water bottling operations in the Great Lakes
basin argue that the industry is important in the economic devel-
opment of the area.22 Without a doubt, a water bottling plant pro-
vides a significant tax base, jobs, and income, all of which are
especially needed in rural areas where such a plant is likely to be
located. The basin's water increases in economic value as it is
purified, packaged, and labeled, and many argue that this eco-
nomic gain benefits Great Lakes basin residents, who fill the jobs
Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the United States (Feb. 22, 2000), at
"Water Uses in the Great Lakes: Removals," available at: http://www.ijc.org/php/
publications/html/finalreport.html#3 (last visited September 22, 2007).
17. Id at §3.
18. Id.
19. Peter Luke, Is Water a Resource or a Commodity? Governors,
Environmentalists Debate Question and Issue of Diversion, GRAND RAPIDS PRESS, Oct.
16, 2005, at State.
20. Patricia Sellers, Perrier Plots its Comeback, FORTUNE, April 23, 1990.
21. Tony Clarke, Loophole Allows Bottlers to Take, Sell Water from the Great
Lakes, MERRILLVILLE POST-TRIBUNE, August 24, 2005.
22. Jerome Hinkle, Troubled Waters: Policy and Action in the Great Lakes, 20 T.M.
COOLEY L. REV. 281, 315 (2003).
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in plants that perform these functions." But most industry sup-
porters fail to see the impact of water withdrawals. Those who
hope to halt bottling operations cite economic and ecologic losses
associated with lower water levels: freighters must carry less
cargo, hydro-electric power plants are less productive, fish and
wildlife have to look for new spawning and feeding areas, boat
docks have to be extended, and other water-pumping industries
(including those feeding municipal water supplies) have to pump
the water higher.24 These effects derogate uses for other stake-
holders. For instance, Native American tribes who have fished in
the Great Lakes for generations claim that bottling plants
threaten their treaty rights to access of lakes and tributaries in
the Basin.25
Concerned citizens and environmental groups find a founda-
tion for their arguments in the public trust doctrine. First applied
to the Great Lakes and the lands thereunder in the 1892 case Illi-
nois Central R.R. v. Illinois,26 the public trust doctrine describes
the "principle that navigable waters are preserved for public use,
and that the state is responsible for protecting the public's right to
the use."27 In other words, a state holds certain types of resources
in a trust for its citizens, and citizens may have a common law
cause of action when the state fails to protect, or in some cases,
threatens to give away its control of the resource in trusty.2
State and federal courts treat Great Lakes Basin citizens as
beneficiaries of the trust, thus protecting public access rights for
navigation, fishing, and hunting fowl.29 The Great Lakes states
23. Luke, supra note 14.
24. Sally Cole-Misch, Great Lakes Diversions: A Conflict Assessment, in
Perspectives on Ecosystem Management for the Great Lakes, in PERSPECTIVES ON
ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR THE GREAT LAKES 287, 289(Lynton K. Caldwell, ed.,
1988) (citing Nancy Webb Hatton, The 'Plot' to Steal the Great Lakes, DETROIT NEWS,
November 28, 1982).
25. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great Springs Waters of
America, Inc. 203 F.Supp. 2d 853, 854 (W.D. Mich 2002).
26. Illinois Central R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
27. BLAcieS LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
28. Illinois Cent. R.R., 146 U.S. at 387.
29. Collins v. Gerhardt, 211 N.W. 115, 117 (Mich. 1927). In Illinois Central
Railroad v. Illinois, the Supreme Court held that an ordinance granting a railroad
company lakefront and adjacent lake-bottom property "was inoperative to affect,
modify, or in any respect to control the sovereignty and dominion of the state over the
lands, or its ownership thereof . . . There can be no irrepealable contract in a
conveyance of property by a grantor in disregard of a public trust, under which he was
bound to hold and manage it." Illinois Cent. R.R. Co., 146 US at 460. See also James
M. Olson, Great Lakes Water, MICH. B.J., Dec. 2001, at 33 (2001). The Canadian
government has also recognized the Great Lakes as a public trust. Walpole Island
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are charged with a fiduciary duty to protect this inalienable trust
for citizens." Bottling undermines the public trust by granting
rights and access to private corporate interests. The mere men-
tion of privatizing Great Lakes water and exporting it out of the
basin inspires intense emotion in Basin residents who have made
efforts to protect the waters. "The water [is] suddenly viewed as
an economic commodity to be sold, rather than a life-sustaining
resource to be protected."3' Anti-commodity and especially anti-
export sentiments explain the recent public outcry and press cov-
erage afforded to the bottled water debate.2
Considering this disregard for the public trust, privatization
of the Great Lakes may lead to problems with policy enforcement.
As at least one Great Lakes scholar suggests, privatization under-
mines the important role of the government, thus "distancing citi-
zens from legitimate rights," especially since goals of the private
market often conflict with goals of the general public. Further-
more, privatization "ignores ecosystem impacts, water quality,
and downstream users" and "avoids dispute resolution mecha-
nisms," among other issues.3
The strong positions held by each stakeholder in the bottled
water debate, plus the inter-jurisdictional nature of the Great
Lakes themselves, require governing bodies in the Great Lakes
Basin to consider the implications of their actions in an incredibly
broad context. Without doubt, this places legislators in a difficult
position, as many constituents may favor a less strict regulatory
regime for the Great Lakes. Individual state regulatory regimes
address the localized impacts of withdrawals of water. The IJC
considers such local impacts to be the major threat from bottled
water. 4 While some states may effectively conserve water
resources through individual state regulations, other states' regu-
First Nation v. Canada, 119 C.R.R. (2d) 79, para. 9 (Ontario 2004). Canadian courts
have upheld the notion of "public rights in the environment that reside in the Crown,"
relying on Eurpoean and American public trust analysis. British Columbia v.
Canadian Forest Products, 2 S.C.R. 74, para. 74 (Can. 2004).
30. Scott D. Hubard, Everything Old is New Again: Water Resource Protection in
the 21st Century, MICH. B.J., Nov. 2005, at 30.
31. Cole-Misch, supra note 24, at 290.
32. Recent news articles expose Nestl4 Waters North America Inc.'s bottling
operations in Michigan. See Luke, supra note 19; Hawthorne, supra note 4; Ginsburg,
supra note 4. Other articles discuss Great Lakes policy in regards to bottled water.
See Great Lakes Deal Would Allow Water Bottling, KITCHENER-WATERLOO REC., Nov.
24, 2005, at Front; Clarke, supra note 21; John Flesher, Trade Debate Clouds Great
Lakes Plan, DULUTH NEws-TRIB., Oct. 25, 2004, at Front.
33. Hinkle, supra note 22, at 294.
34. International Joint Commission, supra note 16, §3.
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lations may favor consumptive water use, depending on the inter-
est of the constituencies. Therefore, a purely state-level
regulatory regime for the Great Lakes Basin will likely produce
patchy results, with some states exhausting or otherwise affecting
the resource disproportionately.
If conservation of the Great Lakes is a major concern, the
inter-jurisdictional nature of the issue and of the Basin itself
requires some degree of cooperation in policy-making. Legislators
must consider the Great Lakes Basin as a complete ecosystem to
best preserve the resource for future enjoyment by its their own
constituents and for the Basin as a whole. Actions in one jurisdic-
tion may diminish the water supply in another jurisdiction. Eco-
systems do not respect political borders, but political borders must
respect ecosystems. Unfortunately, "political borders often
impede integrated cooperative action."3 Even if the effects of the
bottled water industry are localized in nature, that is, drops in the
water table are specific to the watershed in which the withdrawal
site lies, a single bottling facility may affect multiple jurisdictions
because watersheds often straddle political boundaries. 36 Further-
more, even minute fluctuations in water levels can frustrate
entire ecosystems, causing erosion and other shoreline changes,
and modifying habitats for shoreline species, among other
effects. 7
II. PRIOR TREATIES, LEGISLATION, AND AGREEMENTS
A. Boundary Waters Treaty (1909)
At a broad level, Great Lakes states and provinces have in
fact recognized the need for inter-jurisdictional policy and cooper-
ation since the turn of the 20th century. The first major agree-
ment allocating Great Lakes water between Canada and the
United States is the Boundary Waters Treaty (1909)2 Limited in
scope to portions of lakes and rivers adjacent to the international
boundary, the Treaty provides mechanisms for dispute resolution
35. PAUL R. MULDOON, ET AL., CROss-BORDER LITIGATION: ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS
IN THE GREAT LAKES ECOSYSTEM 2 (Carswell 1986).
36. For a map of American watersheds, including the Great Lakes Basin
watersheds, see U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Surf Your Watershed, http:fl
cfpub.epa.gov/suf/locate/index.cfm (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
37. See generally CHRISTINE MANNINEN & ROGER GAUTHIER, LIVING WITH THE
LAKEs 29-30 (1999).
38. Multilateral Treaty Between the United States and Great Britain Relating to
Boundary Waters Between the United States and Canada, U.S.-Gr. Brit., Jan. 11,
1909, 36 Stat. 2448 [Boundary Waters Treaty].
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between the parties. The Treaty also lists a number of principles
for Great Lakes governance, based on the view that either country
may take unilateral action to exploit water resources so long as it
does not directly injure the other. This vague reciprocal standard
seems to avoid ecosystem-wide considerations of the entire
Basin. 9
Perhaps the most progressive of the Treaty's provisions, and
the Treaty's major import in today's policy decisions, comes
largely from its creation of the International Joint Commission
(IJC). The IJC, which consists of three commissioners from the
United States and three commissioners from Canada, has juris-
diction over the use, obstruction, and diversions of the Great
Lakes.40 While some maintain that the IJC is of little influence
because of its limited adjudicative power,4 the IJC's push towards
an ecosystem-wide "precautionary principle" approach42 to man-
agement paved the way for subsequent agreements, and continues
to affect Great Lakes policy decisions.43 The Boundary Waters
Treaty, of course, makes no concession for bottled water or even a
distinction between different types of withdrawals, but was an
important first step towards later policy framework and is still in
effect to this day.
B. Great Lakes Basin Compact (1968)
Next in the series of cross-border agreements is the Great
Lakes Basin Compact, approved by Congress in 1968. The 1968
Compact creates the Great Lakes Commission, comprised of com-
missioners from each of the eight Great Lakes states. The Com-
mission has the power to study relevant water use data and make
recommendations regarding water use to state and local legisla-
39. Hall, supra note 5, at 417.
40. Boundary Waters Treaty, supra note 38. See also Gov'T OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL.
PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 41.
41. Hall, supra note 5, at 418.
42. One example of the IJC's commitment to the "precautionary principle" is the
IJC's calling for a phase out of persistent and bioaccumulative substances in the
Great Lakes Basin due to the difficulty of eliminating these substances from the
Great Lakes once they enter the ecosystem. See Joel Tickner, A Commonsense
Framework for Operationalizing the Precautionary Principle, Prepared for the
Wingspread Conference on Strategies for Implementing the Precautionary Principle,
Jan. 23-25, 1998, available at: http://www.johnsonfdn.org/conferences/precautionary/
tick.html (last visited Sept. 23, 2007).
43. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 32 (citing International Joint Commission, Protection
of the Waters of the Great Lakes: Final Report to the Governments of Canada and the
United States (Feb. 22, 2000), http://www.ijc.org/php/publications/html/finalreport.
html.
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tures." As the recommendations put forth by the Commission are
not binding, the 1968 Compact lacks force in today's policy-mak-
ing arena, but the Commission nonetheless exemplifies early
attempts at making Great Lakes policy inter-jurisdictional (or at
least interstate). 5
C. Great Lakes Charter (1985)
The Great Lakes Charter, signed in 1985 by the eight Great
Lakes states and two Great Lakes provinces, is another important
step towards today's policy of thwarting large diversions and con-
sumptive uses, but letting smaller-scale consumptive uses escape
regulation. The Charter is a mere good-faith agreement,46 but
attempts to implement notice provisions for major diversions,
transparency among jurisdictions, information exchange, consul-
tation procedures, and a new Water Resource Management Com-
mittee .4  Despite its lack of enforceability, the Charter serves to
regulate massive diversions of water from the basin to the extent
that decision-makers take other states' interests into considera-
tion before approving a diversion. 48  The Charter, like more
recently signed agreements, draws a distinction between with-
drawals based on the size of the operation, requiring consultation
only for withdrawals that exceed an average of five million gallons
per day for a 30-day period.49 The Charter also distinguishes
between existing withdrawals and new or increased withdrawals
and, in broad terms, calls for more stringent regulation of new or
increased withdrawals. This distinction is particularly notewor-
thy, as it re-appears in the 2005 Agreement and Compact.5
44. Great Lakes Basin Compact, Pub. L. No. 90-419, 82 Stat. 414, 414-415 (1968).
45. "Provided that no action of the Commission shall have the force of law in, or be
binding upon, any party state." Id., at 418. See also Hall, supra note 5, at 423.
46. The rights of each State and Province under this Charter are mutually
dependent upon the good faith performance by each State and Province of its
commitments and obligations under the Charter." Council of Great Lakes Governors,
Great Lakes Charter, Feb. 22, 1985, http://www.cglg.org/pub/charter/index.html.
47. Id.
48. "It is the intent of the signatory States and Provinces that no Great Lakes
State or Province will approve or permit any major new or increased diversion or
consumptive use of the water resources of the Great Lakes Basin without notifying
and consulting with and seeking the consent and concurrence of all affected Great
Lakes States and Provinces." Id. at 2.
49. Id. at 4.
50. Id. at 2 ("The signatory State and Provinces agree that new or increased
diversions and consumptive uses of Great Lakes Basin water resources are of serious
concern" (emphasis added)); Compact, supra note 2; Agreement, supra note 2.
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D. Water Resources Development Act (1986)
The U.S. Congress enacted the Water Resources Development
Act (WRDA) of 1986 to address concerns over withdrawals from
the Great Lakes and other water use issues throughout the
nation. WRDA's major import is its approval provision; each
Great Lakes state governor may veto any other state's new with-
drawal (including diversion or export) from the basin. 1 Unlike
more recent agreements, WRDA does not install a blanket prohi-
bition on certain types or sizes of diversions or withdrawals, but
provides an alternative mechanism for checking the activities of
other states. WRDA also falls short of complete and comprehen-
sive management because, among other barriers, it lacks a private
right of enforcement. 2 However, WRDA presents an innovative
approach to management and another instrument in a state's
growing arsenal of interstate enforcement possibilities.
E. Great Lakes Charter Annex (2001)
The final step towards the 2005 Compact and Agreement was
the Great Lakes Charter Annex of 2001. Signed by the governors
of each Great Lakes State and by premiers of "associate member"
provinces,53 the Annex supplements the 1985 Great Lakes Charter
and outlines directives for enacting future binding agreements,
setting an appropriate decision making standard for assessing
withdrawals, encouraging public participation, and reviewing
projects under WRDA. The Annex avoids specific guidelines
restricting water uses but expresses a commitment to investigate
and set such guidelines in a future agreement. 4 Like its predeces-
sors and successor, the Annex's key directives apply only to new or
increased withdrawals. 5
51. Water Resources Development Act, 42 U.S.C. §1962d-20(d) (1986).
52. In Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians, the US District Court applied
the Cort factors for an implied private cause of action to the WRDA and held that no
such cause of action exists. Little Traverse Bay Bands of Odawa Indians v. Great
Springs Waters of America, Inc., 203 F.Supp.2d 853, 863 (W.D. Mich 2002) (citing
Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975)). See also Charles F. Glass, Jr., Enforcing Great Lakes
Water Export Restrictions Under the Water Resources Development Act of 1986, 103
COLUM. L. REV. 1503, 1513 (2003).
53. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes Charter Annex, June 18, 2001,
4, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/docs/GreatLakesCharterAnnex.pdf. The Charter
Annex does not explain what "associate status" entails.
54. Id. at 1, 3.
55. "The new set of binding agreement(s) will establish a decision making
standard that the States and Provinces will utilize to review new proposals to
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III. THE GREAT LAKES-ST. LAWRENCE RIVER BASIN
SUSTAINABLE WATER RESOURCES AGREEMENT
AND COMPACT
A. How the Agreement and Compact Work
On December 13, 2005, each of the eight Great Lakes gover-
nors and two Great Lakes premiers signed The Great Lakes-St.
Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water Resources Agreement
(Agreement), and the U.S. Governors also signed a counterpart
Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sustainable Water
Resources Compact (Compact).56 Together, these documents serve
as the implementation agreements for the earlier Great Lakes
Charter Annex. 7 Although the Agreement uses language similar
to that of a treaty, it is in fact non-binding.5 Because of Constitu-
tional restraints, and Congress's previous exercise of its treaty
power over the Great Lakes in the Boundary Waters Treaty of
1909, the parties to this agreement may enact only a good-faith
agreement. 9
The Compact, on the other hand, is a binding agreement and
requires each state to enact legislation to implement the Com-
pact's standards.6" A compact allows for collaborative and
dynamic action among states without the rigid requirements of a
withdraw water from the Great Lakes Basin as well as proposals to increase existing
water withdrawals or existing water withdrawal capacity." Id. at 2.
56. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Projects: Great Lakes Water Management
Initiative, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/annex200llmplementing.asp (last
visited Sept. 23, 2007).
57. See id.
58. John R. Crook, Eight U.S. Great Lakes States, Ontario, and Quebec Conclude
New Agreements to Limit Diversions of Water from the Great Lakes Basin, 100 AM. J.
INT'L L. 467 (2006).
59. The Compact Clause of the US Constitution states that "[n]o State shall,
without the Consent of Congress... enter into any Agreement or Compact with
another State, or with a foreign Power. . .No state shall enter into any Treaty,
Alliance, or Confederation." U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. The likelihood of Congress
approving a Compact between the states and foreign provinces is slim, as Congress
denied Compact status to the original Great Lakes Compact in 1968. Also, because a
treaty already governs the Great Lakes (the Boundary Waters Treaty), Congress is
likely to deem any attempt by states to enter into a binding agreement an
impermissible attempt at entering into a treaty. The parties to the Agreement avoid
Constitutional scrutiny by adopting a non-binding, cooperative approach. Hall, supra
note 5, at 445-446.
60. Section 7.3 of the Compact provides enforcement mechanisms to compel
compliance. Section 8.7 states that the "Compact shall continue in force and remain
binding upon each and every Party unless terminated." Compact, supra note 2, at
§7.3. Section 8.7 states that the "Compact shall continue in force and remain binding
upon each Party unless terminated." Id. at §8.7.
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federal mandate." According to the Council of State Governments,
interstate compacts are "among the most powerful, durable, and
adaptive tools for ensuring cooperative action among states.""
Once approved by Congress, a Compact becomes binding as fed-
eral law and is enforceable as a contract between the parties."
The Compact becomes effective when ratified through legislation
of each of the party states, thus placing a duty upon these states
to draft and enact appropriate policy.' As of January 2008, Min-
nesota and Illinois had enacted the Compact into law; New York
had passed a bill in two Chambers; and Michigan, Indiana, Ohio
and Pennsylvania had bills under active consideration.65
The Agreement and Compact draw a clear distinction
between water diversions and withdrawals or consumptive uses.
The term "diversion" refers to transfer of water from the Basin to
another watershed. "Withdrawal" refers to any taking of surface
or groundwater, including water that stays in the basin and con-
sumptive uses (water withdrawn or withheld from the Basin that
is lost to evaporation, incorporation into products, or other
processes).66
B. Regulatory Distinctions and the "Product"
Loophole
The major provision of the Agreement and the Compact is a
ban on new or increased large-scale water diversions from the
basin, with minor exceptions based on emergency or to provide
water to municipalities that straddle the border of the basin.67
The Agreement and Compact also call for management of new or
increased withdrawals and consumptive uses. These withdrawals
and consumptive uses are subject to a decision-making standard
61. Council of State Governments- National Center for Interstate Compacts,




63. Texas v. New Mexico, 428 U.S. 124, 128 (1987).
64. Compact, supra note 2, § 9.4.
65. Council of Great Lakes Governors, Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin
Water Resources Compact Implementation, http://www.cglg.org/projects/water/
CompactImplementation.asp (last visited Sept. 29, 2007); see also COUNCIL OF GREAT
LAKES GOVERNORS, GREAT LAKES COMPACT MovEs FORWARD, THE COMPASS, Sept.
2006, http://www.cglg.org/news/TheCompass/Compass-2006-Issue3.pdf (discussing
the stage of the legislative process at which the compact is in several Great Lakes
states).
66. Agreement, supra note 2, art. 103; Compact, supra note 2, §1.2.
67. Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 200-01; Compact, supra note 2, §§4.8-4.9.
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based upon riparian common law,65 that requires that the pro-
posed use is "reasonable," based upon consideration of other par-
ties' rights. 9 Other, more minor provisions of the Agreement and
Compact include the creation of a Regional Body (Agreement) and
Council (Compact) to determine whether proposed projects meet
the standards and to study and monitor results,7" public participa-
tion and tribal consultation requirements,71 and alternative dis-
pute resolution mechanisms.72 The Agreement and Compact
represent huge progress in "both the substantive legal rules for
water use in the Great Lakes basin and the cooperative manage-
ment among the states and provinces that share this resource."7
Policy-makers, the public, and even environmental groups praise
the Agreement and Compact, mostly citing its ban on large-scale
diversions, but overlook or underestimate other implications.74
The most dangerous of these overlooked implications is the
classification and treatment of water bottling operations under
the Agreement and the Compact. While the prohibition of water
diversions may protect the Great Lakes from demands by drier
states in the Southwest, the lack of a strong standard for other
types of water uses continues to threaten Great Lakes water
levels. The Agreement and Compact's language, particularly in
defining the types of withdrawals it regulates, describing the deci-
sion making standard and scope, and exempting existing water
withdrawals from regulation, opens a loophole for the bottled
water industry to pump and export Basin water. While the Agree-
ment and Compact effectively address the harms of large-scale
diversion, they fall short in regulating smaller consumptive uses,
which in the future may collectively amount to massive amounts
of water removed from the Basin.
As previously stated, the Agreement and the Compact pro-
68. Hall, supra note 5, at 435.
69. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203; Compact, supra note 2, §4.11.
70. Agreement, supra note 2, at ch. 4; Compact, supra note 2, at art. 2.
71. Agreement, supra note 2, at arts. 503-504; Compact, supra note 2, at arts. 5-6.
72. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 601; Compact, supra note 2, §7.2.
73. Hall, supra note 5, at 435.
74. Great Lakes Deal Would Allow Water Building, KITCHENER RECORD, Nov. 24,
2005,at Front; Press Release, Gov. George E. Pataki of New York, Gov. Pataki
Proposes Legislation to Enact Historic Great Lakes Compact (May 25, 2006), 2006
WLNR 9039504; Doug Draper, Water Ban a Good Step: Rigby, NIAGARA THis WEEK,
Dec. 23, 2005, at B; Steve Erwin, Pact Shuts Great Lakes Export Tap; Ontario,
Quebec, Eight States Sign Deal, HAMILTON SPECTATOR, Dec. 14, 2005, at Canada/
World.
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hibit "diversions."" A diversion is defined as "a transfer of water
from the Basin into another watershed, or from the watershed of
one of the Great Lakes into that of another by any means of trans-
fer."76 The definitions in both documents specifically state that
water withdrawn to be incorporated into a "product" does not con-
stitute a diversion.77 A "product," according to the Agreement and
Compact is "something produced in the Basin by human or
mechanical effort... and used in manufacturing, commercial, or
other processes or intended for immediate or end use by consum-
ers.""8 Clearly, bottled water is a "product" and therefore the ban
on diversions does not equate to a ban on bottling water. Bottled
water and other "products" fall under the "withdrawal/consump-
tive use" category, defined as "that portion of the Water With-
drawn or withheld from the Basin that is lost or otherwise not
returned to the Basin due to... incorporation into processes."79
The Agreement and Compact again exempt bottled water
from strict regulation and let bottled water escape the ban, so long
as the water is removed in containers holding less than 5.7 gal-
lons. Although the practice of bottling water and sending it
outside the basin for sale would clearly constitute export, neither
the Agreement nor the Compact regulate such exports when kept
to small enough containers.0 This provision, combined with spe-
cific classifications as "consumptive use" (falling under "withdraw-
als"), precludes any attempt to argue that water bottling and
export is effectively a "diversion," even where the bottled water is
exported to localities outside of the Basin.
With bottled water falling under the Agreement and Com-
pact's less stringent regulatory regime for withdrawals and con-
sumptive uses, the effects on the bottled water industry are
uncertain and subject to individual state and provincial policy
75. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 200; Compact, supra note 2, § 4.8.
76. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 103; Compact, supra note 2, § 1.2.
77. This definition, however, ".... does not apply to Water that is used in the Basin
or a Great Lake watershed to manufacture or produce a Product that is then
transferred out of the Basin or watershed." Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 103;
Compact, supra note 2, § 1.2.
78. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 103; Compact, supra note 2, § 1.2.
79. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 103; Compact, supra note 2, § 1.2.
80. "A Proposal to Withdraw Water and to remove it from the Basin in any
container greater than 5.7 gallons shall be treated under this Compact in the same
manner as a Proposal for a Diversion. Each Party shall have the discretion, within its
jurisdiction, to determine the treatment of Proposals to Withdraw Water and to
remove it from the Basin in any container of 5.7 gallons or less." Agreement, supra
note 2, at art. 207(9); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.12(10). See also Clarke, supra note
21.
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decisions. The Agreement and Compact provide that each party
shall create a program for the management of such withdrawals
and consumptive uses "by adopting and implementing Measures
consistent with the 'Decision-Making Standard."'' 1 Furthermore,
states and provinces are charged with setting their own threshold
levels for regulation of withdrawals and consumptive uses. 2 The
vague scope of the documents allows a state or province to omit
the bottled water industry from its water management program.
Even vaguer than the Agreement and Compact's scope of
applicability is the "Decision Making Standard" itself. Both the
Agreement and the Compact list five criteria for any type of water
use management. First, "all water withdrawn should be
returned... to the Source Watershed less an allowance for con-
sumptive use."83 Since bottling water constitutes an entirely con-
sumptive use, the first criterion contributes nothing to the
regulation of bottled water.
Second, the withdrawal or consumptive use "shall be imple-
mented so as to ensure that the Proposal will result in no signifi-
cant individual or cumulative adverse impacts to the quantity or
quality of the Waters."84 Without a definition of "significant
impacts," this criterion may be very easily manipulated and
avoided.
Third, the withdrawal or consumptive use shall incorporate
"Environmentally Sound and Economically Feasible Water Con-
servation Measures.""5 In considering a project's conservation
measures for the purposes of the standard, states and provinces
are to make decisions that are not only environmentally sound but
also technically and economically feasible and cost effective.
86
Considerations of cost and availability will likely relax the tech-
nology requirements and overall restrictions on water bottling
plants.
Fourth, the withdrawal or consumptive use shall be imple-
mented in compliance with "all applicable municipal, state, and
federal laws, as well as regional interstate and international
agreements, including the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909."'1
81. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 206; Compact, supra note 2, § 4.10.
82. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 206; Compact, supra note 2, § 4.10.
83. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203(1); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11(1)
[emphasis added].
84. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203(2); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11(2).
85. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203(3); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11(3).
86. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203(3); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11(3).
87. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203(4); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11(4).
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The import of this criterion is likely to be marginal since, as
described above, the state, federal, and international laws (espe-
cially the Boundary Waters Treaty) do little to regulate bottled
water in the first place.
The fifth and arguably most malleable criterion is a simple
reasonableness standard. This requires a consideration of the
"balance between economic development, social development and
environmental protection."8 By failing to prioritize environmen-
tal protection above economic and social development, the Agree-
ment and Compact add weight to arguments for bottling water;
after all, exploitation of the resource means more jobs for local citi-
zens. The Agreement and Compact's puny decision making stan-
dard for withdrawals and consumptive uses makes enforceability
of regulation of the bottled water industry nearly impossible.
Moreover, the Agreement and Compact's ban of diversion and
"Decision Making Standard" for withdrawals and consumptive
uses apply only to new or increased diversions or withdrawals. 89 A
limited number of additional but less operative provisions have
potential to influence existing water use projects, including
existing water bottling plants. Under the Compact, the parties
are required to develop a water resources inventory within five
years of the effective date of the Compact.90 Under both the Agree-
ment and the Compact, any person (or corporation) who with-
draws at least 100,000 gallons per day on average must register
with the state or province. Each state or provincial party must
report the information gathered pursuant to the inventory and
registration provision to an international database of water uses
in the basin.91 While an inventory and registration program are
certainly an important step towards a holistic regulation of water
uses in the basin, the Agreement and Compact do not require the
states or provinces to directly or immediately restrict water uses
based on this information. 92
Another potential restraint on existing water uses, the parties
are required to develop individual water conservation and effi-
88. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203(5)(c); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11(5)(c).
89. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 200 and art. 203; Compact, supra note 2,
§ 4.8, § 4.10.
90. Compact, supra note 2, § 4.1(1).
91. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 301; Compact, supra note 2, § 4.1.
92. The Compact states that such information gathered by the parties shall be put
forth to develop a mechanism by which cumulative impacts of withdrawals,
consumptive uses, and diversions shall be assessed. Agreement, supra note 2, at art.
301(4); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.1(6).
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ciency goals and implement either a voluntary or mandatory
water conservation and efficiency program.93 The Agreement and
Compact do not provide stringent guidelines for such programs,
and parties are left entirely to their own devices. 4 Finally, the
parties are required to conduct periodic assessment of the cumula-
tive impacts of withdrawals, diversions, and consumptive uses.
The assessments are meant to set a baseline standard of review
for new or increased withdrawals or consumptive uses.9 In this
sense, state and provincial policy makers are urged to consider
existing uses indirectly in setting the requirements for the Agree-
ment and Compact's operative standards for new or increased
uses. However, this provision lacks specificity and again leaves
the responsibility up to the state and provincial parties to set the
final baseline;96 this lack of uniformity and accountability to other
jurisdictions arguably places Basin-wide goals of resource conser-
vation further out of reach. The provision appears to be extremely
difficult to monitor by other parties, and is therefore unlikely to be
enforced. The Agreement and Compact's weak and confusing
framework for regulation of existing diversions, withdrawals, and
consumptive uses avoids stepping on states' and provinces' indi-
vidual regulatory schemes and interests. In other words, existing
water uses are subject only to the state or province's regulations,
and states and provinces may regulate or not regulate as they see
fit, upsetting notions of a state's responsibility and accountability
to the rest of the Basin.97
While permitting states and provinces to regulate water uses
on a case-by-case basis promotes flexibility and consideration of
state or province-specific problems and goals,98 the ecosystem-
wide approach to Great Lakes management requires some degree
of uniformity of enforcement and basin-wide regulation, or at least
93. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 304; Compact, supra note 2, § 4.2.
94. Each party is to develop its own goals and objectives, consistent with the
basin-wide goals, and is responsible for assessing its programs in meeting the party's
goals and objectives. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 304(2); Compact, supra note 2,
§ 4.2(2).
95. The Agreement requires that parties list existing water withdrawals
approvals or list the capacity of existing systems, with these volumes constituting the
baseline volume for regulations of new or increased uses. Agreement, supra note 2, at
art. 207(1) and 209. The Compact employs a more general "assessment" requirement.
Compact, supra note 2, § 4.15.
96. "The Parties have the responsibility of conducting this Cumulative Impact
assessment." Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203. Compact, supra note 2, § 4.15(2).
97. See Hall, supra note 5, at 436.
98. Marlissa S. Briggett, State Supremacy in the Federal Realm: The Interstate
Compact, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 751, 767 (1991).
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state responsibility for promoting basin-wide goals.99 The Agree-
ment and Compact's deference to state policy with respect to new
or increased withdrawals or consumptive uses and with respect to
existing water diversions, withdrawals, or consumptive uses could
present a threat to this valuable resource if states and provinces
seek to protect the interests of industry within their borders.
More specifically, with respect to bottled water, the Agree-
ment and Compact leave existing water bottling plants virtually
untouched,0 0 and new or increased bottling operations subject
only to a weak "reasonableness" standard, 101 so long as water is
removed from the basin in containers holding less than 5.7 gal-
lons.10 2 As the bottled water industry continues to pump, bottle,
and export Great Lakes water out of the Basin, citizens feel the
positive short-term economic impacts paired with the negative
long-term environmental impacts of such a patchy regulatory
regime.
IV. IMPLICATIONS AND CONSIDERATIONS OF A NON-
REGULATORY REGIME FOR BOTTLED WATER AND
OTHER "PRODUCTS"
A. NAFTA
The consequences associated with this failure to restrict
export of bottled water from the Great Lakes intensify in the con-
text of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the
Commerce Clause. NAFTA requires that nation parties afford
each other "treatment no less favorable than it accords to like
goods... of any other country."0 3 Furthermore, a nation party
may not apply any standards-related measure that creates an
unnecessary obstacle to trade unless it overcomes the burden of
99. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem Governance: Scale,
Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 209 (2002). See also Muldoon,
supra note 35, at 2 (explaining that any method of identifying areas by group is
inherently insufficient due to the interdependency of the ecosystem as a whole); GovTw
OF CAN. & U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 1, at 5 (discussing the complexities
of ecosystem management). See generally George Francis, The North American
Experience Managing International Transboundary Water Resources: The
International Joint Commission and the International Boundary and Water
Commission Part 2, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 315 (1993) (discussing ecosystem
management issues).
100. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203; Compact, supra note 2, § 4.10.
101. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 203(5); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.11(5).
102. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 207(9); Compact, supra note 2, § 4.12(10).
103. North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 904(3), Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M.
289 [hereinafter NAFTA].
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proving that the measure is meant to achieve a legitimate objec-
tive." ' These provisions serve NAFTA's primary function of pro-
moting free conditions of fair competition in the free trade area
and eliminating barriers to trade.0 5 The United States and
Canada, as nation parties to NAFTA, may not treat other each
other or Mexico differently with respect to import and export regu-
lations. This may mean that exports cannot be subject to quanti-
tative restrictions or an export ban.06 Canadians in particular
fear that by allowing US-based private interests to draw and bot-
tle water (treated as a commodity and therefore subject to
NAFTA), the Agreement and Compact open up the possibility of a
variety of commercial interests entering the Basin to export water
to all corners of the globe virtually without restriction.0 7
NAFTA Chapter Eleven highlights the ban on discriminatory
regulation that is relevant to water bottling in the Great Lakes.
No party to NAFTA may "directly or indirectly nationalize or
expropriate an investment of an investor or another party in its
territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or
expropriation of such an investment [expropriation], except: a) for
a public purpose, b) on a non-discriminatory basis, c) in accor-
dance with due process of law and the general principles of treat-
ment provided in [NAFTA] Article 1105(1), and d) upon payment
of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6." '
Therefore, in allowing domestic bottled water companies to pump
from the Great Lakes and distribute bottled water about the U.S.
and Canada, the Agreement and Compact preclude the "non-dis-
criminatory basis" exception to Chapter Eleven's prohibition on
regulation of the good. If the U.S. can pump, bottle, and export
water in the Great Lakes Basin, investors (private interests) from
other signatory nations may bring suit if they are denied the simi-
lar opportunity to pump and bottle in the Basin.' 9
To be subject to the free trade provisions of NAFTA, a product
or export must be considered a "good" or part of an "investment"
104. Id. at art. 904(4).
105. Id. at art. 102.
106. Valiante, supra note 5, at 533.
107. "By classifying water as a product instead of a publicly owned natural
resource, he (James M. Olson, attorney) says it makes it an article of commerce. And
that, he says, opens the door to lawsuits claiming that denying outsiders access to
Great Lakes water gives an unfair competitive advantage to businesses within the
basin." John Flesher, Attorney Warns of Dangers in Water Protection Plan, DULUTH
NEWS TRIBUNE, Dec. 24, 2005, at Local.
108. NAFTA, supra note 103, at art. 1110.
109. See Hinkle, supra note 22, at 303.
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measure.11° By allowing bottled water to be exported from the
Great Lakes Basin, the Agreement and Compact impliedly treat
bottled water as a good. It is noteworthy that the drafters of the
Agreement and Compact avoid using the words "good" and "com-
modity" to describe exports, instead opting for the terms "product"
and "consumptive use."' Nevertheless, bottled water will likely
be treated as such, as it had been prior to the Agreement and
Compact.
NAFTA commentators agree that water in its natural state is
generally not regarded as a "good," and therefore not subject to
NAFTA free trade requirements. When water is pumped, pack-
aged, and placed into the stream of commerce in the form of bot-
tled water, however, few would dispute that it has become a
"good" with respect to the agreements."' Both the U.S. and
Canada list tariffs for certain types of water exports in their tariff
and customs schedules, indicating treatment of bottled water as a
good which can be traded internationally."3 Because of the almost
inevitable classification of bottled water as a "good," Great Lakes
policy-makers have already incorporated and will continue to
incorporate non-discriminatory treatment into all decisions
regarding withdrawals from the basin."' In practical effect, any
future restriction on water uses and export within the Basin will
likely be subject to a stricter scrutiny as a result of the "good"
classification.
Fortunately for Great Lakes governors and premiers seeking
to protect water resources, NAFTA permits certain exceptions to
this anti-discrimination requirement for measures necessary to
protect human, animal or plant life or health and measures in
relation to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources." 5
However, these exceptions have been strictly interpreted by the
110. NAFTA, supra note 103, at art. 300 ("This Chapter applies to trade in goods of
a Party"). NAFTA also applies to any other investments of a party within the Great
Lakes Basin.
111. Agreement, supra note 2, at art. 103; Compact, supra note 2, § 1.2.
112. "[G]oods of a Party means domestic products as these are understood in the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or such goods as the Parties may agree, and
includes originating goods of that Party." NAFTA, supra note 103, at art. 201(1); see
also Valiante, supra note 5, at 533-34 (discussing the implications for the
categorization of water under the NAFTA agreement).
113. Hinkle, supra note 22 at 301 (citing United State International Trade
Commission, Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States § 2201).
114. Valiante, supra note 5, at 534.
115. Id. at 534-35.
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World Trade Organization (WTO). 116 The likelihood of a future
regulatory regime for the export of bottled water in the Great
Lakes region surviving NAFTA scrutiny depends on demonstrat-
ing that the primary purpose of such regulation is conservation
and applying similar prohibitive regulations and enforcement to
jurisdictions within the Basin itself.117
In their non-regulation of a bottled water "good," the Agree-
ment and Compact avoid run-ins with NAFTA's prohibitions on
quantity-based or discriminatory regulations of the international
market."8 While the Agreement and Compact may not intensify
the effects of NAFTA on the bottled water regime, beyond
acknowledging that bottled water is in fact a good subject to free
trade agreements and by perpetuating the status quo of non-regu-
lation, they provide an excellent illustration of the context of the
bottled water debate. If water is continually treated as a good or
commodity and policy makers cannot define restrictions with the
primary purpose of conservation, bottled water will remain the
great loophole in Great Lakes water use management.
B. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause, which allows the U.S. Congress to
"regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several
states, and with the Indian tribes,""9 and the dormant Commerce
Clause, which prevents states from so regulating beyond the lim-
its of their police powers, also warrant consideration in the bottled
water discussion. In Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, the
U.S. Supreme Court applied constitutional Commerce Clause
scrutiny to a state's attempts to regulate intrastate water
resources for conservation and preservation purposes and held
that groundwater was in fact an article of commerce, thus striking
down state policy of restricting transfers of groundwater. 120 The
case sets a precedent for Great Lakes states, stripping them of the
opportunity to restrict the export of water from the basin unless
116. The WTO is the successor to GATT. The exceptions at issue originated in
GATT but have been adopted by NAFTA. See id. at 535.
117. Id. at 535-36.
118. Maude Barlow, chairwoman of the Council of Canadians explains that "the
[Canadian] federal government can't legally ban bulk water exports because water is
included in NAFTA." Dennis Bueckert, Pressure to Export Water to U.S. Likely to
Grow, KITCHENER RECORD, Dec. 23, 2005, at Front.
119. U.S. CONST. ART. I, § 8, CL. 3.
120. Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 1954 (1982).
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the state is similarly regulating its own use of the resource. 121
Once approved by Congress, however, the Compact takes the
force of federal law and removes Commerce Clause restraints,
which allows for more stringent regulation.'2 2 The Compact's ban
on large-scale diversions, for instance, should withstand constitu-
tional scrutiny. If the Compact had similarly banned smaller-
scale consumptive uses, including bottled water, this prohibition
would theoretically withstand such scrutiny as well, at least with
respect to the Commerce Clause. However, the failure to regulate
bottled water with the interstate agreement creates what seems
like a hopeless situation for state and local governments attempt-
ing to keep Great Lakes water in the Great Lakes. Any attempt
by a state to regulate water as commerce beyond the limited scope
of the Compact - a cap on quantity pumped and bottled, for exam-
ple - will likely present a dormant Commerce Clause problem.
V. PRIVATE JUDICIAL ACTION: ALL THAT'S LEFT FOR GREAT
LAKES STAKEHOLDERS?
While the Agreement and Compact garner praise from policy-
makers, commentators, and environmentalists for their no non-
sense ban on large-scale water diversions, the virtually non-exis-
tent regulatory regime for certain consumptive uses, including
bottling, provokes an opposite feeling among many other affected
parties.123 For citizens concerned by this lack of regulation, a few
prospects remain at least partially available to protect the
resource. First, the public trust doctrine, which citizens have
relied on for decades to protect certain natural commons, remains
untouched by the Agreement and Compact and available as a
potential cause of action. 124 But as one scholar suggests, the pub-
lic trust doctrine is merely a background principle, not a strict
doctrine that promises to succeed in all cases. 2 ' Second, common
121. Hall, supra note 5, at 452; see also Julia R. Wilder, Questions of Ownership
and Control, in PERSPECTIVES ON ECOSYSTEM MANAGEMENT FOR THE GREAT LAKES
243, 260-61 (Lynton K. Caldwell, ed., 1988) (discussing the constitutional implications
of state water management).
122. Hall, supra note 5, at 451.
123. John Flescher, Bottled Water Exports OK Under Proposed Compromise,
DULUTH NEWS TRIBUNE, Dec. 13, 2005, at Local.
124. "An approval by a Party or the Council under this Compact does not give any
property rights, nor any exclusive privileges, nor shall it be construed to grant or
confer any right, title, easement, or interest in, to or over any land belonging to or
held in trust by a Party." Compact, supra note 2, § 8.1(4); see also Tarlock, supra note
8, at 40 (discussing the Public Trust doctrine); Olson, supra note 29, at 36.
125. Tarlock, supra note 8, at 40.
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law water rights may still apply. 126 These rights include riparian
rights, "a system in which water is not capable of ownership but
owners of land bordering watercourses have rights of access to
water that cannot be transferred to non-riparians."127 Common
law also provides a scheme of rights regulating the use of ground-
water, which varies depending on the state.2 ' A very recent and
"highly publicized" 129 Michigan case provides an in-depth analysis
of each of these approaches employed in litigation, as well as a
state law with a citizen suit provision. 30
A. Common Law, the Public Trust Doctrine, and
State Statutes in Michigan Citizens for Water
Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters North America,
Inc.
In December 2000, Great Spring Waters of America, Inc.
(Great Springs), the predecessor to Nestl6 Waters North America
Inc. (Nestl6), purchased rights to pump groundwater from prop-
erty owned by a private party in Mecosta County, Michigan.'3 '
Beginning in early 2001, Great Springs installed four wells at that
location, constructed its bottling plant twelve miles away from the
site, and prepared to pump 400 gallons of groundwater per minute
from the Great Lakes Basin. 1 2 The Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality (MDEQ) issued permits to use the four
wells in August 2001 and February 2002.1"'
Concerned about Great Spring's presence in the Basin, a
group of local citizens organized to challenge Great Springs and
126. "Nothing contained in this Compact shall be construed as affecting or
intending to affect or in any way to interfere with the law of the respective Parties
relating to common law Water rights." Compact, supra note 2, § 8.1(2).
127. Valiante, supra note 5, at 540.
128. Hall, supra note 5, at 427.
129. See generally Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. NestI Waters
North America Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich. 2007).
130. The lower court opinion in Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation also
provides pertinent and interest analysis on these questions, though, the case does not
specifically address the 2005 Agreement and Compact, it serves as an example of the
other potential regulatory approaches for bottled water in the Great Lakes Basin.
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters North America Inc., 709
N.W.2d 174 (Mich. Ct. App. 2005), affd in part and rev'd in part, Michigan Citizens
for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters North America Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447 (Mich.
2007).
131. Michigan Citizens, 709 N.W.2d at 184.
132. Id. at 184-85.
133. Id. at 184.
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prevent groundwater removal from that region. 3 1 Calling itself
Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation (MCWC), the citizen
group brought action against Great Springs in Michigan state
court in September 2001.131 MCWC alleged six counts. Count I
sought an injunction against construction of wells, wellhouses,
and a pipeline between the wells and the bottling plant. Count II
challenged the defendant's withdrawal as unlawful under com-
mon law riparian water rights. Count III alleged that the with-
drawal was unlawful under common law groundwater rights.
Count IV asserted the public trust doctrine, which states the
defendant may not withdraw or use the water in a way that con-
flicts with the public's title. Similarly, count V alleged an unlaw-
ful taking of public resources. Count VI alleged the defendant's
violation of the Michigan Environmental Protection Act
(MEPA).
136
The trial court granted summary disposition in favor of defen-
dant Nestl6 for Count II, on the belief that the plaintiffs common
law claims should not be based on riparian water rights but
instead on groundwater law. 137 The trial court also granted sum-
mary disposition to Nestl6 for Count IV, the public trust allega-
tions, reasoning that because the stream from which Nestl6
planned to pump was not navigable, the public trust doctrine did
not apply.3 ' Later, the trial court dismissed Count V for failure to
state a claim. 139 Fortunately, MCWC's Counts III and VI, based
on common law groundwater rights and MEPA, respectively, sur-
vived summary disposition.'
After testimony from numerous technical experts before the
bench, the trial court determined that the defendant's pumping
"had harmed and will continue to harm" the plaintiffs' interests in
134. Id. at 184; see also Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation website, http:ll
www.savemiwater.org (stating that the group was "[olrganized for educational and
scientific purposes, MCWC's goal is to conserve, preserve and protect Michigan's
water, natural resources and the public trust in those resources for the benefit of the
public.") (last visited November 19, 2006).
135. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709 N.W.2d at 185.
136. Id. at 185. MEPA allows jurisdiction for the attorney general or any person to
maintain action where "the alleged violation occurred or is likely to occur for
declaratory and equitable relief against any person for the protection of the air, water,
and other natural resources and the public trust in these resources from pollution,
impairment, and destruction." MICH. COMP. LAWS §324.1701 (2007).
137. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709 N.W.2d at 185.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 186.
140. Id.
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their property and water use.141 The trial court also concluded
that the defendants had violated MEPA by unlawfully diminish-
ing the stream and removing water from a wetland.' The court
held that these violations warranted an injunction halting Great
Springs (now Nestl6's) bottled water operations at that location.'
Nestle subsequently filed an emergency application for leave to
appeal and the court granted a stay of the injunction, but prohib-
ited any pumping from that site beyond a 250 gallons per minute
monthly average.4
The Michigan Court of Appeals found that the trial court
erred by applying a hybrid rule of its own making for groundwater
rights disputes.'45 After describing the history of groundwater law
in Michigan, the appellate court concluded that the appropriate
test was a reasonable use balancing test. 46 Applying this test to
the record, however, the appellate court reached the same point as
the trial court: that Nestl6's operations in Mecosta County did in
fact and will continue to interfere with the rights of other users in
the region.
147
In ascertaining relevant factors to be considered in a balanc-
ing test for reasonable use, the appellate court highlighted three
underlying principles of common law in that area.
First, the law seeks to ensure a 'fair participation' in the
use of water for the greatest number of users. Hence, the
court should attempt to strike a proper balance between
protecting the rights of the complaining party and preserv-
ing as many beneficial uses of the common resource as is
feasible under the circumstances. Second, the law will only
protect a use that is itself reasonable... Third, the law will
not redress every harm, no matter how small, but will only
address unreasonable harms."48
With these principles in mind, and some guidance from prior cases
applying a similar balancing test, the appellate court listed sev-
eral factors to consider: the use, its extent, duration, necessity,




144. Id. at 186 n. 16.
145. Id. at 193-94.
146. Id. at 201.
147. Id. at 206.
148. Id. at 202 (citing Dumont v. Kellogg, 29 Mich. 420 (1874); People v. Hulbert, 91
N.W. 211, 218 (Mich. 1902); Bernard v. City of St. Louis, 189 N.W. 891, 893 (1922);
Thompson v. Enz, 154 N.W.2d 473, 484-85 (Mich. 1967)).
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stream, the extent of injury to one party at the benefit of the other,
the benefits obtained and the detriments suffered, the interests of
the state, and others.'49
The appellate court highlighted MCWC's members' other uses
of the water at the Mecosta County site, including recreational
boating, wildlife observation, swimming, fishing, plus the aes-
thetic value of their riparian lands, and determined that these
uses were in fact reasonable.15 ° The court next looked to the defen-
dant's use of bottling water, and determined that this too was a
reasonable use, citing increased employment and tax revenue for
the county.151 Since the plaintiffs uses were directly related to the
use and enjoyment of their adjacent land, and the defendant's use
was not directly related to the land the water is pumped from, the
plaintiffs enjoyed some preference with respect to the "type of use"
factor.152 MCWC emphasized its concern for "use of water for
farming, business, industry, recreation, and local communities,"
emphasizing that "the evaluation and regulation of these uses and
their impacts should not be confused with the authorization to
withdraw and sell or transfer raw water for the sake of selling it
outside the scope of reasonable use."5 3 In terms of the detrimen-
tal effects of Nestl6's use, the court found a high degree of harm to




Perhaps the deciding factor, however, was the lack of neces-
sity of such a high pumping volume at Nestl6's pumping site. The
record contained some evidence that Nestl6 had augmented the
supply of water at other plants by shipping the water in to its bot-
tling plant.5 5 The court reasoned that because Nestle had already
successfully explored other sources for water, it did not need to
maintain its previously higher pumping volume. 5 ' Applying the
reasonable use balancing analysis affirmed the conclusion that
pumping 400 gallons per minute from the Mecosta site for bottled
water was an unreasonable use of the basin's groundwater.
157
149. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709 N.W.2d at 185.
150. Id. at 205.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 206.
153. James M. Olson, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Natural
Resources and Environmental Affairs 2, Nov. 26, 2001, http://www.savemiwater.org/
news/JMO-Testimony-11262001.pdf.
154. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709 N.W.2d at 206.
155. Id. at 207.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 207.
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While the appellate court refused to grant an injunction over the
entirety of the pumping project, it remanded to determine an
appropriate maximum pumping volume to enforce against
Nestl6. 15
Nestle also appealed the trial court's finding that their pump-
ing violated MEPA per se, by violating both the Inland Lakes and
Streams Act (ILSA) and the Wetlands Protection Act (WPA).
15 9
The appellate court reversed, on the basis that neither ILSA nor
the WPA provided appropriate standards for MEPA analysis
because neither of the statutes is a pollution control statute.6 °
Because MEPA does not provide specific standards, the "judicial
development of a common law of environmental quality, as envi-
sioned by the Legislature," must be ascertained. 161 Therefore,
MEPA standards can either come from similar pollution control
statutes or from judge-made common law. The appellate court
disagreed with the trial court's reasoning but remanded to deter-
mine whether Nestle violated MEPA based on some other
standards.
Finally, MCWC appealed the trial court's dismissal of Count
IV of its Complaint, based on the public trust doctrine. 162 The
appellate court cited cases from the Michigan Supreme Court in
upholding the notion that the public trust doctrine applies only to
navigable waters.' 6' The plaintiffs evidence to support a finding
of navigability was not sufficient to reach this requirement and
the court refused to expand protection under the public trust doc-
trine."M However, the court provided very specific instructions as
to how to overcome this prerequisite to asserting public trust pro-
tection - with evidence that the body of water is capable of floating
rafts or logs, which sheds light on how future cases can proceed
under this doctrine.1 65
158. Id. at 209.
159. Id. at 212.
160. Id. at 216.
161. Id. at 212 (citing Ray v. Mason Co. Drain Comm'r., 224 N.W.2d 883, 889 (Mich.
1975)).
162. Id. at 217.
163. Id. at 218. "The public-trust doctrine applies only to navigable waters and not
to all waters of the state." Id. (citing Bott v. Dep't of Natural Res., 327 N.W.2d 838,
846 (Mich. 1982).
164. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709 N.W.2d at 219-22.
165. The court addressed a dispute over the appropriate test for navigability and
supported the log-flotation test used in Bott, 327 N.W.2d at 838. "Hence, plaintiffs
could have shown that the Dead Stream was navigable by presenting evidence that
the stream was historically used to float logs, by demonstrating through tests that the
stream can actually support the flotation of logs, or through comparison with streams
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Despite support from the State of Michigan and numerous
other environmental organizations,166 MCWC took an even harder
blow when the Michigan Supreme Court held that MCWC lacked
standing to challenge the effects of Nestl6's bottling operations on
certain affected waters within the Basin. 16 7 The Supreme Court
effectively divided the waters at issue into two categories to
resolve the standing issue: waters that members of MCWC owned
and/or used and waters for which MCWC never alleged ownership
or use. Specifically, the court noted that MCWC "failed to demon-
strate that they use the Osprey Lake Impoundment and Wetlands
112, 115, and 301. " 168 According to the Michigan Supreme Court,
because MCWC lacked ownership and never alleged use of Osprey
Lake and particular wetlands, it also lacked a "concrete, particu-
larized injury in fact," which was "fatal to plaintiffs' standing" to
bring claims over those wetlands.6 9 Reversing only in part, how-
ever, the Michigan Supreme Court held that MCWC did enjoy
standing over those wetlands owned or used by members of
MCWC:
To be clear, we are refining, not dismissing, plaintiffs
MEPA claim. Plaintiffs enjoy the full protection that MEPA
affords to vindicate their riparian property interests. Thus,
they have standing insofar as Nestl6's pumping activities
inflicted an injury in fact with respect to the Dead Stream
and Thompson Lake. However, plaintiffs cannot similarly
establish standing with respect to Osprey Lake and Wet-
already determined to be navigable." Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709
N.W.2d at 219.
166. The State of Michigan filed an amicus brief in the Michigan Supreme Court
asserting the state's "inherent and constitutional authority" to regulate water use in
the "public's paramount interest." Brief of Amicus Curiae Michigan Department of
Environmental Quality at 6, Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestle
Waters North America, Inc., No. 254202 (Mich. Ct. App. May 19, 2005), available at
http://www.deq.state.mi.us/documents/deq-wb-nestle.brief.pdf. Over 100
organizations and individuals also signed a letter to the court in support of MCWC.
Open Letter Regarding the Case of Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6
Waters North America, Now Before the Michigan Supreme Court, available at http://
www.savemiwater.org/news/An%200pen%20Letter%20regarding%20the%20case%
20ofo20Michigan%20Citizens%20for%2OWater%20Conservation%20vs.mht (last
visited Sept. 30, 2007).
167. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl6 Waters North America,
Inc., 737 N.W.2d 447, 463 (Mich. 2007).
168. Id. at 449.
169. Id. at 456. To successfully allege standing, a plaintiff must prove 1) injury in
fact; 2) a causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained of; and 3)
redressability. Id. at 444-45 (citing Nat'l Wildlife Federation v. Cleveland Cliffs Iron
Co., 684 N.W.2d 800, 813-14 (Mich. 2004)).
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lands 112, 115 and 301.170
MCWC's complaint therefore survived the Michigan Supreme
Court decision in that it successfully alleges the elements of
standing with respect to at least some bodies of water.
The Michigan Supreme Court refused to address the merits of
the case, and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings
consistent with its opinion on standing. 7' Bound by Supreme
Court's opinion on standing and the Court of Appeals' opinion on
the appropriate test to be employed to reach the merits (the "rea-
sonable use balancing test" described above), the trial court must
reconsider the merits with respect only to those wetlands for
which MCWC has proper standing, and must apply the Court of
Appeals' test to do so.
For the parties to this particular litigation, the question
remains whether the trial court will determine that MCWC's
interest in the portion of wetlands that its members do in fact own
and/or use outweighs Nestl6's interest in its bottling operation
and that such a weighing of interests still warrants an injunction.
For other parties interested in water rights in the Basin, however,
the decisions of the Court of Appeals and the Michigan Supreme
Court answer a number of questions.
While not binding on other state or provincial jurisdictions,
the Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation v. Nestl Waters
North America, Inc. decisions exemplify several judicial
approaches to tackling water rights issues at work. Specifically,
the Court of Appeals decision describes the applicability and scope
of the public trust doctrine and provides a clear-cut test for deter-
mining whether a water resource falls within the public trust.172
The Court of Appeals also describes its "reasonable use balancing
test" which may be relied upon or similarly employed in other
jurisdictions.173 Of course, the Michigan Supreme Court describes
the prerequisites to bringing such a suit in the first place in its
discussion of standing. As standing remains a universal concern
among jurisdictions, courts of other states, provinces, or federal
governments will likely employ a similar standing test and reach
similar outcomes as the Michigan Supreme Court.'74 In a broader
170. Id. at 456.
171. Id. at 449 ("Hence, we limit our decision to the issue of standing. We do not
pass on the merits of the other issues raised on appeal.").
172. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709 N.W.2d 174, 218-19 (Mich. Ct.
App. 2005).
173. Id. at 201-202.
174. Standing in U.S. federal courts, for instance, requires the same three elements
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sense, the numerous and lengthy opinions of the various courts to
address the case paint a picture of the complexities of water rights
litigation in the Basin or elsewhere.
As it stands, the case represents the (albeit narrow) prospect
of certain judicial mechanisms for regulation of water uses in the
Basin. The limited applicability of common law (riparian or
groundwater law), however, makes such action a last resort to
check large companies that hope to exploit Great Lakes water for
commercial interest in bottling and exporting the water. Simi-
larly, the public trust doctrine can be a useful tool, although its
applicability is limited to cases where the plaintiff can prove that
the affected body of water is navigable. 7 5 Finally, a state environ-
mental regulation with a citizen suit provision, such as MEPA,
might be a useful tool, but may be restrained in itself by NAFTA
and the dormant Commerce Clause. 176 Moreover, because state
regulations serve primarily local interests, they may threaten the
now-favored notion of basin-wide cooperative effort, especially if
they undermine the policy or water uses of other jurisdictions in
the basin.
On a broader level, the resort to judicial action amounts to
mere case-by-case regulation and ad-hoc determinations, rather
than address the basin as a whole. Perhaps of more concern, the
standing issue described by the Michigan Supreme Court presents
a major barrier to parties seeking to challenge water use in the
future.
Despite their shortcomings and limited scope, the judicial
mechanisms of common law, the public trust doctrine, and statu-
tory challenges via a citizen suit provision are crucial in light of
the Agreement and Compact's failure to set clear and enforceable
restrictions on the water "products" industry. With hope, this com-
bination of common law riparian and/or groundwater principles,
protection of navigable waters under the public trust doctrine, and
described by the Michigan Supreme Court: 1) injury in fact; 2) causation; and 3)
redressability. See, eg., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-561 (1992).
While standing requirements in Canada may differ significantly from those in federal
or state courts in the U.S., the mere existence of a standing threshold will likely
create a barrier to plaintiffs in either country: "[ailmost any jurisdiction faces similar
concerns about breadth of standing... these are not nation-specific issues; they are
universal." Rebecca Lefler, A Comparison of Comparison: Use of Foreign Case Law as
Persuasive Authority by the United States Supreme Court, the Supreme Court of
Canada, and the High Court of Australia, 11 S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 165, 175 (2001).
175. Michigan Citizens for Water Conservation, 709 N.W.2d at 218.
176. NAFTA, supra note 103; Sporhase v. Nebraska, ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941
(1982).
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some degree of state or province-level regulation will fill the gaps
left open by the Agreement and Compact.
VI. CONCLUSION
Considering the background of lax policy against water bot-
tling operations in the Great Lakes Basin and the constraints on
parties imposed by free trade agreements and the Constitution, it
is no surprise that the Great Lakes-St. Lawrence River Basin Sus-
tainable Water Resources Agreement and Compact effectively dis-
regard this major concern of many Great Lakes stakeholders.
Certainly, a more comprehensive policy approach is needed to
ensure protection of a natural resource so important to so many
stakeholders. On a positive note, although failing to sufficiently
regulate the bottled water industry, the Agreement and Compact
employ strict measures to restrict other detrimental water uses
and recognize the need for inter-jurisdictional cooperation for
Great Lakes management.
Until a more holistic statutory mechanism is available, Great
Lakes stakeholders may take some relief in lasting common law
notions of riparian and groundwater rights and also the public
trust doctrine. In combination with the Agreement and Compact,
these judicial mechanisms may serve an important purpose in reg-
ulating the bottled water industry and other water uses in the
immediate future. However, as described above, these rights are
not absolute and may be limited in their applicability. Total pro-
tection of the Great Lakes waters requires a more concrete,
enforceable, and uniformly recognized restriction on previously
avoided water uses, including bottling.
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